AS200132 ASPA Check - NETONE NL Peter Paul Maria Kurstjens

NETONE-NL Peter-Paul Maria Kurstjens🇳🇱 - ASPA check for AS200132: the upstream transit providers AS200132 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS200132 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS200132 has not published its own ASPA object, but 18 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
18 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
18

Peering Topology

AS200132 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 18 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS198834, AS202585, AS207487, AS210320, AS211358, AS212855, AS213052, AS213409 and more.AS200132 - NETONE-NL Peter-Paul Maria KurstjensAS200132NETONE-NL Peter-Paul …AS198834net-noahlvb-nl Noah v…AS198834 - net-noahlvb-nl Noah van BochoveAS202585bgp-rodeo Nick Bouwhu…AS202585 - bgp-rodeo Nick BouwhuisAS207487routing-cafe Gustav C…AS207487 - routing-cafe Gustav CaplanAS210320FEXXIO-DIGITAL Cedric…AS210320 - FEXXIO-DIGITAL Cedric HoogendoornAS211358AS-IPV6GO Patrizio Pa…AS211358 - AS-IPV6GO Patrizio PalumboAS212855AS-LUJE Jelle LuteijnAS212855 - AS-LUJE Jelle LuteijnAS213052BittenBytes Bram Witt…AS213052 - BittenBytes Bram Wittendorp trading as BittenBytesAS213409Lynqia Daniil KovalAS213409 - Lynqia Daniil KovalView all 18 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(18)

These ASNs list AS200132 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS198834🇳🇱net-noahlvb-nl Noah van Bochove
AS202585🇳🇱bgp-rodeo Nick Bouwhuis
AS207487🇳🇱routing-cafe Gustav Caplan
AS210320🇳🇱FEXXIO-DIGITAL Cedric Hoogendoorn
AS211358🇮🇹AS-IPV6GO Patrizio Palumbo
AS212855🇳🇱AS-LUJE Jelle Luteijn
AS213052🇳🇱BittenBytes Bram Wittendorp trading as BittenBytes
AS213409🇺🇦Lynqia Daniil Koval
AS214380🇳🇱TIM427 Tim de Boer trading as tim427.net
AS215248🇳🇱BastiaanBrink Bastiaan Mathijs Brink
18 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS200132 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS200132 (NETONE-NL Peter-Paul Maria Kurstjens) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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