AS209022 ASPA Check - Tschajera Limited Tschajera Limited

Tschajera-Limited Tschajera Limited🇬🇧 - ASPA check for AS209022: the upstream transit providers AS209022 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS209022 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS209022 has not published its own ASPA object, but 8 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
8 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
8

Peering Topology

AS209022 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 8 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS54148, AS199518, AS201439, AS205848, AS209718, AS213576, AS215223, AS402801.AS209022 - Tschajera-Limited Tschajera LimitedAS209022Tschajera-Limited Tsc…AS54148DYNAMIC-QUANTUM-NETWO…AS54148 - DYNAMIC-QUANTUM-NETWORKS - Dynamic Quantum NetworksAS199518GSHAPIRO-AS Gregory S…AS199518 - GSHAPIRO-AS Gregory ShapiroAS201439Haaland Hans Christia…AS201439 - Haaland Hans Christian HaalandAS205848Server-Network-Pohl D…AS205848 - Server-Network-Pohl Dominik PohlAS209718REDPANDA-DNS-AS Jori …AS209718 - REDPANDA-DNS-AS Jori VannesteAS213576ERTIUS-NET Robert WeirAS213576 - ERTIUS-NET Robert WeirAS215223ADEKABANG-AS-ID Moham…AS215223 - ADEKABANG-AS-ID Mohammad RaskaAS402801ANDRII-NET - AndriiAS402801 - ANDRII-NET - AndriiUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(8)

These ASNs list AS209022 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS54148🇨🇦DYNAMIC-QUANTUM-NETWORKS - Dynamic Quantum Networks
AS199518🇺🇸GSHAPIRO-AS Gregory Shapiro
AS201439🇳🇴Haaland Hans Christian Haaland
AS205848🇩🇪Server-Network-Pohl Dominik Pohl
AS209718🇧🇪REDPANDA-DNS-AS Jori Vanneste
AS213576🇮🇪ERTIUS-NET Robert Weir
AS215223🇮🇩ADEKABANG-AS-ID Mohammad Raska
AS402801🇺🇸ANDRII-NET - Andrii
About ASPA - what it is and why AS209022 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS209022 (Tschajera-Limited Tschajera Limited) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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