AS212895 ASPA Check - ROUTE64 ORG Johannes Ernst

ROUTE64_ORG Johannes Ernst🇩🇪 - ASPA check for AS212895: the upstream transit providers AS212895 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS212895 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS212895 has not published its own ASPA object, but 238 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
238 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
238

Peering Topology

AS212895 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 238 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS13317, AS13334, AS18710, AS20447, AS31184, AS31806, AS33711, AS34445 and more.AS212895 - ROUTE64_ORG Johannes ErnstAS212895ROUTE64_ORG Johannes …AS13317AS-WAN - Wan holdings…AS13317 - AS-WAN - Wan holdings LLCAS13334RAPIDZONE - RapidzoneAS13334 - RAPIDZONE - RapidzoneAS18710ASHTONSETH - Ashton S…AS18710 - ASHTONSETH - Ashton S Williams, Sole ProprietorshipAS20447KITAUJI-NETWORKS - Ki…AS20447 - KITAUJI-NETWORKS - Kitauji Networks LLCAS31184MBNET-AS Michael Buss…AS31184 - MBNET-AS Michael BussmannAS31806TERRIBLE-NETWORK - te…AS31806 - TERRIBLE-NETWORK - terrible.networkAS33711SADDLE-NETWORKS - Sad…AS33711 - SADDLE-NETWORKS - Saddle NetworksAS34445SCHECK-AS Robert Sche…AS34445 - SCHECK-AS Robert ScheckView all 238 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(238)

These ASNs list AS212895 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS13317🇺🇸AS-WAN - Wan holdings LLC
AS13334🇨🇦RAPIDZONE - Rapidzone
AS18710🇺🇸ASHTONSETH - Ashton S Williams, Sole Proprietorship
AS20447🇺🇸KITAUJI-NETWORKS - Kitauji Networks LLC
AS31184🇩🇪MBNET-AS Michael Bussmann
AS31806🇺🇸TERRIBLE-NETWORK - terrible.network
AS33711🇺🇸SADDLE-NETWORKS - Saddle Networks
AS34445🇩🇪SCHECK-AS Robert Scheck
AS40929🇺🇸MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDove
AS41047🇳🇱NL-MLAB Bart Vrancken
238 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS212895 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS212895 (ROUTE64_ORG Johannes Ernst) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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