AS24961 ASPA Check - MYLOC WIIT

MYLOC-AS WIIT AG🇩🇪 - ASPA check for AS24961: the upstream transit providers AS24961 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS24961 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS24961 has not published its own ASPA object, but 23 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
23 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
23

Peering Topology

AS24961 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 23 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS13301, AS18001, AS24492, AS41047, AS47536, AS50873, AS52112, AS57575 and more.AS24961 - MYLOC-AS WIIT AGAS24961MYLOC-AS WIIT AGAS13301WIIT WIIT AGAS13301 - WIIT WIIT AGAS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS24492IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiC…AS24492 - IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiCAM Corporation Ltd.AS41047NL-MLAB Bart VranckenAS41047 - NL-MLAB Bart VranckenAS47536PathConnect PathConne…AS47536 - PathConnect PathConnect GmbHAS50873AS50873 David Doepelh…AS50873 - AS50873 David DoepelheuerAS52112GENTLENT-AS Gentlent …AS52112 - GENTLENT-AS Gentlent GmbHAS57575NETM-AS NETMOUNTAINS …AS57575 - NETM-AS NETMOUNTAINS Group GmbHView all 23 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(23)

These ASNs list AS24961 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS13301🇩🇪WIIT WIIT AG
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS24492🇰🇭IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiCAM Corporation Ltd.
AS41047🇳🇱NL-MLAB Bart Vrancken
AS47536🇩🇪PathConnect PathConnect GmbH
AS50873🇩🇪AS50873 David Doepelheuer
AS52112🇩🇪GENTLENT-AS Gentlent GmbH
AS57575🇩🇪NETM-AS NETMOUNTAINS Group GmbH
AS59645🇩🇪WYBT-NET Tobias Fiebig
AS62086🇩🇪VIADE VIA-ONLINE GmbH
23 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS24961 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS24961 (MYLOC-AS WIIT AG) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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