AS3399 ASPA Check - OBE NET Obenet AB

OBE-NET Obenet AB🇸🇪 - ASPA check for AS3399: the upstream transit providers AS3399 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS3399 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS3399 has not published its own ASPA object, but 10 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
10 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
10

Peering Topology

AS3399 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 10 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS39889, AS50989, AS58317, AS206075, AS208453, AS209625, AS210083, AS214503 and more.AS3399 - OBE-NET Obenet ABAS3399OBE-NET Obenet ABAS39889DCS-Networks-AS Fredr…AS39889 - DCS-Networks-AS Fredrik HolmqvistAS50989DCS-Networks-AS SITAB…AS50989 - DCS-Networks-AS SITAB InfrastrukturAS58317EMBARK Embark Studios…AS58317 - EMBARK Embark Studios ABAS206075HOLLANDER-JACOBSEN Ho…AS206075 - HOLLANDER-JACOBSEN Hollander Jacobsen UG (haftungsbeschraenkt)AS208453SWEHOST-NET Johan Kar…AS208453 - SWEHOST-NET Johan Karlsson trading as SweHostingAS209625redcluster Redcluster…AS209625 - redcluster Redcluster LTDAS210083Privex Privex Inc.AS210083 - Privex Privex Inc.AS214503QUXLABS QuxLabs ABAS214503 - QUXLABS QuxLabs ABView all 10 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(10)

These ASNs list AS3399 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS39889🇸🇪DCS-Networks-AS Fredrik Holmqvist
AS50989🇸🇪DCS-Networks-AS SITAB Infrastruktur
AS58317🇸🇪EMBARK Embark Studios AB
AS206075🇩🇪HOLLANDER-JACOBSEN Hollander & Jacobsen UG (haftungsbeschraenkt)
AS208453🇸🇪SWEHOST-NET Johan Karlsson trading as SweHosting
AS209625🇨🇾redcluster Redcluster LTD
AS210083🇧🇿Privex Privex Inc.
AS214503🇸🇪QUXLABS QuxLabs AB
AS214640🇸🇪HOSTUP Hostup AB
AS215467🇪🇪Skhron Skhron OU
About ASPA - what it is and why AS3399 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS3399 (OBE-NET Obenet AB) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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