AS35598 ASPA Check - INETCOM CARRIER

INETCOM INETCOM CARRIER LLC🇷🇺 - ASPA check for AS35598: the upstream transit providers AS35598 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS35598 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS35598 has not published its own ASPA object, but 6 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
6 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
6

Peering Topology

AS35598 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 6 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS49418, AS62379, AS200993, AS205421, AS207676, AS214891.AS35598 - INETCOM INETCOM CARRIER LLCAS35598INETCOM INETCOM CARRI…AS49418AS-NETSHIELD NETSHIEL…AS49418 - AS-NETSHIELD NETSHIELD LTDAS62379FREEWAY FREEWAY LLCAS62379 - FREEWAY FREEWAY LLCAS200993NyaCore Yanislav Basi…AS200993 - NyaCore Yanislav BasiukAS205421SCULKSOFT-AS Sculk So…AS205421 - SCULKSOFT-AS Sculk Software LLCAS207676BEST-LINE-AS Best Lin…AS207676 - BEST-LINE-AS Best Line Ltd.AS214891CLOUDRIX-RU Denis Ale…AS214891 - CLOUDRIX-RU Denis Aleksandrovich IakovlevUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(6)

These ASNs list AS35598 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS49418🇬🇧AS-NETSHIELD NETSHIELD LTD
AS62379🇷🇺FREEWAY FREEWAY LLC
AS200993🇷🇺NyaCore Yanislav Basiuk
AS205421🇷🇺SCULKSOFT-AS Sculk Software LLC
AS207676🇷🇺BEST-LINE-AS Best Line Ltd.
AS214891🇷🇺CLOUDRIX-RU Denis Aleksandrovich Iakovlev
About ASPA - what it is and why AS35598 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS35598 (INETCOM INETCOM CARRIER LLC) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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