AS39249 ASPA Check - KICUA Netassist International EOOD

KICUA-AS Netassist International EOOD🇧🇬 - ASPA check for AS39249: the upstream transit providers AS39249 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS39249 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS39249 has not published its own ASPA object, but 7 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
7 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
7

Peering Topology

AS39249 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 7 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS18001, AS131314, AS199310, AS212470, AS215715, AS215956, AS219267.AS39249 - KICUA-AS Netassist International EOODAS39249KICUA-AS Netassist In…AS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS131314CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech …AS131314 - CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International LimitedAS199310QFLink-AS XIN BING XI…AS199310 - QFLink-AS XIN BING XIANAS212470LaptopCat Oleksandr K…AS212470 - LaptopCat Oleksandr KurinnyiAS215715AS-VSUA Valerii Solod…AS215715 - AS-VSUA Valerii SolodovichenkoAS215956MYIP-AS Dennis de Hou…AS215956 - MYIP-AS Dennis de Houx trading as All In OneAS219267BO-AS Bilotserkovets …AS219267 - BO-AS Bilotserkovets OleksandrUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(7)

These ASNs list AS39249 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS131314🇭🇰CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International Limited
AS199310🇨🇳QFLink-AS XIN BING XIAN
AS212470🇺🇦LaptopCat Oleksandr Kurinnyi
AS215715🇺🇦AS-VSUA Valerii Solodovichenko
AS215956🇧🇪MYIP-AS Dennis de Houx trading as All In One
AS219267🇺🇦BO-AS Bilotserkovets Oleksandr
About ASPA - what it is and why AS39249 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS39249 (KICUA-AS Netassist International EOOD) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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