AS42093 ASPA Check - INTERRACKS B.V

INTERRACKS-AS InterRacks B.V.🇳🇱 - ASPA check for AS42093: the upstream transit providers AS42093 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS42093 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS42093 has not published its own ASPA object, but 7 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
7 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
7

Peering Topology

AS42093 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 7 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS202585, AS211623, AS213959, AS215085, AS215248, AS396064, AS402338.AS42093 - INTERRACKS-AS InterRacks B.V.AS42093INTERRACKS-AS InterRa…AS202585bgp-rodeo Nick Bouwhu…AS202585 - bgp-rodeo Nick BouwhuisAS211623OXAR NAML B.V.AS211623 - OXAR NAML B.V.AS213959AltStack ObSimRef Die…AS213959 - AltStack ObSimRef Diensten B.V. trading as AltStackAS215085PixelHosting Maik Pol…AS215085 - PixelHosting Maik Polman trading as PixelHostingAS215248BastiaanBrink Bastiaa…AS215248 - BastiaanBrink Bastiaan Mathijs BrinkAS396064BASTIAAN MATHIJS BRIN…AS396064 - BASTIAAN MATHIJS BRINK - H2 Technologies LLCAS402338BRINKLINK - BrinkLinkAS402338 - BRINKLINK - BrinkLinkUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(7)

These ASNs list AS42093 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS202585🇳🇱bgp-rodeo Nick Bouwhuis
AS211623🇳🇱OXAR NAML B.V.
AS213959🇳🇱AltStack ObSimRef Diensten B.V. trading as AltStack
AS215085🇳🇱PixelHosting Maik Polman trading as PixelHosting
AS215248🇳🇱BastiaanBrink Bastiaan Mathijs Brink
AS396064🇺🇸BASTIAAN MATHIJS BRINK - H2 Technologies LLC
AS402338🇺🇸BRINKLINK - BrinkLink
About ASPA - what it is and why AS42093 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS42093 (INTERRACKS-AS InterRacks B.V.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

← Back to AS42093