AS44530 ASPA Check - HOPUS SAS

HOPUS HOPUS SAS🇫🇷 - ASPA check for AS44530: the upstream transit providers AS44530 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS44530 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS44530 has not published its own ASPA object, but 9 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
9 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
9

Peering Topology

AS44530 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 9 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS29222, AS34019, AS35661, AS49028, AS52075, AS197133, AS205845, AS213052 and more.AS44530 - HOPUS HOPUS SASAS44530HOPUS HOPUS SASAS29222Infomaniak-AS Infoman…AS29222 - Infomaniak-AS Infomaniak Network SAAS34019HIVANE Hivane Associa…AS34019 - HIVANE Hivane AssociationAS35661VIRTUASYS-EU VIRTUA S…AS35661 - VIRTUASYS-EU VIRTUA SYSTEMS SASAS49028D-LAKE D-LAKE SASAS49028 - D-LAKE D-LAKE SASAS52075WIFIRST Wifirst S.A.S.AS52075 - WIFIRST Wifirst S.A.S.AS197133MEDIACTIVE-GROUP-AS M…AS197133 - MEDIACTIVE-GROUP-AS MEDIACTIVE SASAS205845PLANISWARE Planisware…AS205845 - PLANISWARE Planisware SAAS213052BittenBytes Bram Witt…AS213052 - BittenBytes Bram Wittendorp trading as BittenBytesView all 9 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(9)

These ASNs list AS44530 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS29222🇨🇭Infomaniak-AS Infomaniak Network SA
AS34019🇫🇷HIVANE Hivane Association
AS35661🇫🇷VIRTUASYS-EU VIRTUA SYSTEMS SAS
AS49028🇫🇷D-LAKE D-LAKE SAS
AS52075🇫🇷WIFIRST Wifirst S.A.S.
AS197133🇫🇷MEDIACTIVE-GROUP-AS MEDIACTIVE SAS
AS205845🇫🇷PLANISWARE Planisware SA
AS213052🇳🇱BittenBytes Bram Wittendorp trading as BittenBytes
AS215596🇫🇷Kissgroup KISSGROUP SAS
About ASPA - what it is and why AS44530 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS44530 (HOPUS HOPUS SAS) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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