AS50673 ASPA Check - Serverius Holding B.V

Serverius-as Serverius Holding B.V.🇳🇱 - ASPA check for AS50673: the upstream transit providers AS50673 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS50673 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS50673 has not published its own ASPA object, but 7 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
7 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
7

Peering Topology

AS50673 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 7 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS12637, AS18001, AS24492, AS38965, AS47583, AS199081, AS216333.AS50673 - Serverius-as Serverius Holding B.V.AS50673Serverius-as Serveriu…AS12637SEEWEB SEEWEB s.r.l.AS12637 - SEEWEB SEEWEB s.r.l.AS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS24492IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiC…AS24492 - IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiCAM Corporation Ltd.AS38965HOSTIN Rick van der S…AS38965 - HOSTIN Rick van der Sterren trading as HostInAS47583AS-HOSTINGER Hostinge…AS47583 - AS-HOSTINGER Hostinger International LimitedAS199081LANCOM Lancom Ltd.AS199081 - LANCOM Lancom Ltd.AS216333AS-NETDEV NetDev UG (…AS216333 - AS-NETDEV NetDev UG (haftungsbeschraenkt)UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(7)

These ASNs list AS50673 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS12637🇮🇹SEEWEB SEEWEB s.r.l.
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS24492🇰🇭IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiCAM Corporation Ltd.
AS38965🇳🇱HOSTIN Rick van der Sterren trading as HostIn
AS47583🇨🇾AS-HOSTINGER Hostinger International Limited
AS199081🇬🇷LANCOM Lancom Ltd.
AS216333🇩🇪AS-NETDEV NetDev UG (haftungsbeschraenkt)
About ASPA - what it is and why AS50673 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS50673 (Serverius-as Serverius Holding B.V.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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