AS58057 ASPA Check - SECUREBIT

SECUREBIT Securebit AG🇨🇭 - ASPA check for AS58057: the upstream transit providers AS58057 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS58057 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS58057 has not published its own ASPA object, but 21 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
21 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
21

Peering Topology

AS58057 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 21 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS17160, AS24492, AS33711, AS57050, AS59570, AS200306, AS200368, AS204033 and more.AS58057 - SECUREBIT Securebit AGAS58057SECUREBIT Securebit AGAS17160NCOM-NA - Neofelis Co…AS17160 - NCOM-NA - Neofelis CommunicationsAS24492IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiC…AS24492 - IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiCAM Corporation Ltd.AS33711SADDLE-NETWORKS - Sad…AS33711 - SADDLE-NETWORKS - Saddle NetworksAS57050DREAMSERVER-SRL Dream…AS57050 - DREAMSERVER-SRL DreamServer S.R.L.AS59570Hostingstudio Jens Zi…AS59570 - Hostingstudio Jens ZimperfeldAS200306BG-STAMOV-AS Ivan Sta…AS200306 - BG-STAMOV-AS Ivan StamovAS200368ABNORMALFREQUENCY-AS …AS200368 - ABNORMALFREQUENCY-AS Abnormal Frequency Single Member P.C.AS204033sarthur Oliver ArthurAS204033 - sarthur Oliver ArthurView all 21 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(21)

These ASNs list AS58057 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS17160🇺🇸NCOM-NA - Neofelis Communications
AS24492🇰🇭IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiCAM Corporation Ltd.
AS33711🇺🇸SADDLE-NETWORKS - Saddle Networks
AS57050🇷🇴DREAMSERVER-SRL DreamServer S.R.L.
AS59570🇩🇪Hostingstudio Jens Zimperfeld
AS200306🇧🇬BG-STAMOV-AS Ivan Stamov
AS200368🇬🇷ABNORMALFREQUENCY-AS Abnormal Frequency Single Member P.C.
AS204033🇩🇪sarthur Oliver Arthur
AS207445🇱🇧AS_VAMH Vincent Maroun
AS207852🇲🇾Y525-Network Yonghan Ching
21 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS58057 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS58057 (SECUREBIT Securebit AG) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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