AS6453 ASPA Check - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA)
AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC🇺🇸 - ASPA check for AS6453: the upstream transit providers AS6453 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS6453 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.
AS6453 has not published its own ASPA object, but 45 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.
Peering Topology
Downstream Customers(45)
These ASNs list AS6453 as an authorized upstream provider.
| ASN | Name |
|---|---|
| AS835 | 🇨🇦GOCODEIT-EDGE - GoCodeIT Inc |
| AS3327 | 🇳🇱CITIC CITIC Telecom CPC Netherlands B.V. |
| AS3855 | 🇧🇲LOGIC-3855 - Logic Communications Ltd |
| AS6206 | 🇳🇱NETROUTING-AS Netrouting B.V. |
| AS8265 | 🇮🇹FASTNET-BKB-ASN FASTNET S.R.L. |
| AS9829 | 🇮🇳BSNL-NIB - National Internet Backbone |
| AS11260 | 🇨🇦EASTLINK-HSI - EastLink |
| AS12541 | 🇪🇸LYNTIA_BB_AS LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A. |
| AS13347 | 🇺🇸MIDWEST-CABLE - Midwest Cable |
| AS14754 | 🇬🇹AS14754 - TELECOMUNICACIONES DE GUATEMALA, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA |
About ASPA - what it is and why AS6453 should publish one
ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.
AS6453 (AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.
Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools
Related Tools and Guides
- How to run an ASPA check - read and verify an ASPA record step by step
- ASPA explained - how provider authorization stops route leaks
- ASPA Check tool - check the ASPA record of any other ASN
- RPKI & ROA Lookup - validate prefixes and check ASPA records for any ASN
- Global ASPA Adoption Statistics - transit-free ASNs, top upstream providers, adoption trends
- AS6453 Overview - prefixes, BGP routes, peers, and RPKI status