AS8903 ASPA Check - AS8903 LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A

AS8903 LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A.🇪🇸 - ASPA check for AS8903: the upstream transit providers AS8903 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS8903 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS8903 has not published its own ASPA object, but 8 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
8 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
8

Peering Topology

AS8903 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 8 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS8239, AS9094, AS12462, AS13186, AS35171, AS42325, AS61098, AS198731.AS8903 - AS8903 LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A.AS8903AS8903 LYNTIA NETWORK…AS8239NEXTLEVEL-CONNECTIVIT…AS8239 - NEXTLEVEL-CONNECTIVITY-ISP LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A.AS9094LYNTIA_MSP_INTERNAL L…AS9094 - LYNTIA_MSP_INTERNAL LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A.AS12462ECE-MAD-DATA Evolutio…AS12462 - ECE-MAD-DATA Evolutio Cloud Enabler SAAS13186ECE-BCN-DATA Evolutio…AS13186 - ECE-BCN-DATA Evolutio Cloud Enabler SAAS35171uniway-AS Uniway Tech…AS35171 - uniway-AS Uniway Technologies SLAS42325UFINET LYNTIA NETWORK…AS42325 - UFINET LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A.AS61098exoscale Akenes SAAS61098 - exoscale Akenes SAAS198731PRISCO-AS Prisco Elec…AS198731 - PRISCO-AS Prisco Electronica S.L.UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(8)

These ASNs list AS8903 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS8239🇪🇸NEXTLEVEL-CONNECTIVITY-ISP LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A.
AS9094🇪🇸LYNTIA_MSP_INTERNAL LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A.
AS12462🇪🇸ECE-MAD-DATA Evolutio Cloud Enabler SA
AS13186🇪🇸ECE-BCN-DATA Evolutio Cloud Enabler SA
AS35171🇪🇸uniway-AS Uniway Technologies SL
AS42325🇪🇸UFINET LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A.
AS61098🇨🇭exoscale Akenes SA
AS198731🇪🇸PRISCO-AS Prisco Electronica S.L.
About ASPA - what it is and why AS8903 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS8903 (AS8903 LYNTIA NETWORKS S.A.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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