AS10099 ASPA Check - China Unicom Global

UNICOM-Global - China Unicom Global🇭🇰 - ASPA check for AS10099: the upstream transit providers AS10099 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS10099 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS10099 has not published its own ASPA object, but 3 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
3 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
3

Peering Topology

AS10099 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 3 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS138166, AS153347, AS202782.AS10099 - UNICOM-Global - China Unicom GlobalAS10099UNICOM-Global - China…AS138166MTATCL-AS-AP - MaxxB …AS138166 - MTATCL-AS-AP - MaxxB Fiber InternetAS153347LCTLAOS-AS-AP - Lao C…AS153347 - LCTLAOS-AS-AP - Lao Communication Technology Sole Co., LtdAS202782EverLink-AS Yaoheng D…AS202782 - EverLink-AS Yaoheng Digital (Shanghai) Technology Co., Ltd.UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(3)

These ASNs list AS10099 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS138166🇲🇲MTATCL-AS-AP - MaxxB Fiber Internet
AS153347🇱🇦LCTLAOS-AS-AP - Lao Communication Technology Sole Co., Ltd
AS202782🇨🇳EverLink-AS Yaoheng Digital (Shanghai) Technology Co., Ltd.
About ASPA - what it is and why AS10099 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS10099 (UNICOM-Global - China Unicom Global) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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