AS12741 ASPA Check - NETIA

AS-NETIA Netia SA🇵🇱 - ASPA check for AS12741: the upstream transit providers AS12741 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS12741 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS12741 has not published its own ASPA object, but 7 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
7 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
7

Peering Topology

AS12741 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 7 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS3327, AS31445, AS35063, AS35378, AS44970, AS198408, AS198457.AS12741 - AS-NETIA Netia SAAS12741AS-NETIA Netia SAAS3327CITIC CITIC Telecom C…AS3327 - CITIC CITIC Telecom CPC Netherlands B.V.AS31445Cloud-AS Fiberax sp. …AS31445 - Cloud-AS Fiberax sp. z o.o.AS35063TKCHOPIN-AS Chopin Te…AS35063 - TKCHOPIN-AS Chopin Telewizja Kablowa spolka z ograniczona odpowiedzialnosciaAS35378SATFILM-AS Sat Film S…AS35378 - SATFILM-AS Sat Film Sp. z o.o.AS44970FIBERAX Fiberax sp. z…AS44970 - FIBERAX Fiberax sp. z o.o.AS198408EMOUSE-NET E-Mouse Ka…AS198408 - EMOUSE-NET E-Mouse Karol UrbanowiczAS198457ECOM ECOM SPOLKA Z OG…AS198457 - ECOM ECOM SPOLKA Z OGRANICZONA ODPOWIEDZIALNOSCIAUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(7)

These ASNs list AS12741 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS3327🇳🇱CITIC CITIC Telecom CPC Netherlands B.V.
AS31445🇵🇱Cloud-AS Fiberax sp. z o.o.
AS35063🇵🇱TKCHOPIN-AS Chopin Telewizja Kablowa spolka z ograniczona odpowiedzialnoscia
AS35378🇵🇱SATFILM-AS Sat Film Sp. z o.o.
AS44970🇵🇱FIBERAX Fiberax sp. z o.o.
AS198408🇵🇱EMOUSE-NET E-Mouse Karol Urbanowicz
AS198457🇵🇱ECOM ECOM SPOLKA Z OGRANICZONA ODPOWIEDZIALNOSCIA
About ASPA - what it is and why AS12741 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS12741 (AS-NETIA Netia SA) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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