AS136255 ASPA Check - TIMCL AP Telecom International Myanmar

TIMCL-AS-AP Telecom International Myanmar Co., Ltd🇲🇲 - ASPA check for AS136255: the upstream transit providers AS136255 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS136255 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS136255 has not published its own ASPA object, but 3 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
3 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
3

Peering Topology

AS136255 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 3 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS151341, AS152466, AS154831.AS136255 - TIMCL-AS-AP Telecom International Myanmar Co., LtdAS136255TIMCL-AS-AP Telecom I…AS151341THENEXTSUCCESS-AS-AP …AS151341 - THENEXTSUCCESS-AS-AP The Next SuccessAS152466TLINKGROUP-AS-AP T-Li…AS152466 - TLINKGROUP-AS-AP T-Link Group Company LimitedAS154831GEGCL-AS-AP Green Emp…AS154831 - GEGCL-AS-AP Green Emperor Group Company LImitedUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(3)

These ASNs list AS136255 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS151341🇲🇲THENEXTSUCCESS-AS-AP The Next Success
AS152466🇲🇲TLINKGROUP-AS-AP T-Link Group Company Limited
AS154831🇲🇲GEGCL-AS-AP Green Emperor Group Company LImited
About ASPA - what it is and why AS136255 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS136255 (TIMCL-AS-AP Telecom International Myanmar Co., Ltd) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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