AS137385 ASPA Check - SADDAMHOSSAIN AP Saddam Hossain Ta Asian Network
PublishedSADDAMHOSSAIN-AS-AP Saddam Hossain ta Asian Network🇧🇩 - ASPA check for AS137385: the upstream transit providers AS137385 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS137385 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.
How to read this ASPA check
The 9 providers below are the only networks allowed to appear directly above AS137385 in an AS-path. If AS137385 uses a transit provider that is missing from this list, routers that enforce ASPA treat its routes through that provider as invalid, so the list should include every current and backup transit provider. Peers do not belong in it.
Step-by-step ASPA check guide - including how to validate an AS-path hop by hop.
Peering Topology
Upstream Providers(9)
AS137385 authorizes these ASNs as upstream transit providers.
| ASN | Name |
|---|---|
| AS18155 | 🇧🇩BISPIET-AS-AP Bangladesh Internet Service Provider Internet Exchange Trust |
| AS56032 | 🇧🇩BTTB-BD BTCL IX service |
| AS58682 | 🇧🇩LEVEL3-BD Level3 Carrier Ltd. |
| AS58717 | 🇧🇩SUMMITCOMMUNICATIONS-BD Summit Communications Ltd |
| AS132602 | 🇧🇩BANGLADESH-AS-AP Bangladesh Submarine Cable Company Limited BSCCL |
| AS134508 | 🇧🇩KLIX-AS-AP KLIX |
| AS139931 | 🇧🇩BANGLADESH-AS-AP Bangladesh Submarine Cable Company Limited BSCCL |
| AS140684 | 🇧🇩BDIX-AS-AP Bangladesh Internet Exchange Trust |
| AS149994 | 🇧🇩RCL-AS-AP Rego Communications Ltd |
ASPA object expires: 2026-10-17
Related Tools and Guides
- How to run an ASPA check - read and verify an ASPA record step by step
- ASPA explained - how provider authorization stops route leaks
- ASPA Check tool - check the ASPA record of any other ASN
- RPKI & ROA Lookup - validate prefixes and check ASPA records for any ASN
- Global ASPA Adoption Statistics - transit-free ASNs, top upstream providers, adoption trends
- AS137385 Overview - prefixes, BGP routes, peers, and RPKI status