AS138616 ASPA Check - Sanuk Systems (Thailand)

SANUK-AS-AP - Sanuk Systems (Thailand) Co., Ltd🇹🇭 - ASPA check for AS138616: the upstream transit providers AS138616 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS138616 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS138616 has no ASPA records.

This ASN has not published an ASPA object and is not listed as an upstream provider by any other ASN.

About ASPA - what it is and why AS138616 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS138616 (SANUK-AS-AP - Sanuk Systems (Thailand) Co., Ltd) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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