AS139831 ASPA Check - DITO TELECOMMUNITY

DTC-AS-AP - DITO TELECOMMUNITY CORP.🇵🇭 - ASPA check for AS139831: the upstream transit providers AS139831 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS139831 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS139831 has not published its own ASPA object, but 6 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
6 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
6

Peering Topology

AS139831 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 6 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS14789, AS56262, AS133585, AS137239, AS154398, AS154876.AS139831 - DTC-AS-AP - DITO TELECOMMUNITY CORP.AS139831DTC-AS-AP - DITO TELE…AS14789CLOUDFLARENET - Cloud…AS14789 - CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc.AS56262USATV-DAGUPAN-AS-AP -…AS56262 - USATV-DAGUPAN-AS-AP - Dagupan Urban Satellite Vision Inc.AS133585BITPI-AS-AP - Bee Inf…AS133585 - BITPI-AS-AP - Bee Information Technology PH Inc.AS137239FPSTI-AS-AP - Fil Pro…AS137239 - FPSTI-AS-AP - Fil Products Service Television IncorporatedAS154398FPSTI-AS-AP - Fil Pro…AS154398 - FPSTI-AS-AP - Fil Products Service Television IncorporatedAS154876MARAWICONNECT-AS-AP -…AS154876 - MARAWICONNECT-AS-AP - MarawiConnectUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(6)

These ASNs list AS139831 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS14789🇺🇸CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc.
AS56262🇵🇭USATV-DAGUPAN-AS-AP - Dagupan Urban Satellite Vision Inc.
AS133585🇵🇭BITPI-AS-AP - Bee Information Technology PH Inc.
AS137239🇵🇭FPSTI-AS-AP - Fil Products Service Television Incorporated
AS154398🇵🇭FPSTI-AS-AP - Fil Products Service Television Incorporated
AS154876🇵🇭MARAWICONNECT-AS-AP - MarawiConnect
About ASPA - what it is and why AS139831 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS139831 (DTC-AS-AP - DITO TELECOMMUNITY CORP.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

← Back to AS139831