AS15802 ASPA Check - DU AS1 Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC

DU-AS1 Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC🇦🇪 - ASPA check for AS15802: the upstream transit providers AS15802 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS15802 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS15802 has not published its own ASPA object, but 7 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
7 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
7

Peering Topology

AS15802 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 7 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS14789, AS18001, AS55569, AS131219, AS131267, AS131314, AS215716.AS15802 - DU-AS1 Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSCAS15802DU-AS1 Emirates Integ…AS14789CLOUDFLARENET - Cloud…AS14789 - CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc.AS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS55569CRITEO-AS-AP - Criteo…AS55569 - CRITEO-AS-AP - Criteo APACAS131219ISPL-AS-AP - Indosat …AS131219 - ISPL-AS-AP - Indosat Singapore Pte. Ltd.AS131267UNITEL-LA - Star Tele…AS131267 - UNITEL-LA - Star TelecomAS131314CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech …AS131314 - CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International LimitedAS215716purecs PURE C S IT IN…AS215716 - purecs PURE C S IT INFRASTRUCTURE L.L.CUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(7)

These ASNs list AS15802 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS14789🇺🇸CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc.
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS55569🇯🇵CRITEO-AS-AP - Criteo APAC
AS131219🇸🇬ISPL-AS-AP - Indosat Singapore Pte. Ltd.
AS131267🇱🇦UNITEL-LA - Star Telecom
AS131314🇭🇰CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International Limited
AS215716🇦🇪purecs PURE C S IT INFRASTRUCTURE L.L.C
About ASPA - what it is and why AS15802 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS15802 (DU-AS1 Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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