AS17494 ASPA Check - Telecom Operator & Internet Service Provider Well

BTTB-AS-AP - Telecom Operator & Internet Service Provider as well🇧🇩 - ASPA check for AS17494: the upstream transit providers AS17494 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS17494 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS17494 has not published its own ASPA object, but 4 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
4 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
4

Peering Topology

AS17494 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 4 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS9230, AS14789, AS24556, AS138505.AS17494 - BTTB-AS-AP - Telecom Operator Internet Service Provider as wellAS17494BTTB-AS-AP - Telecom …AS9230BOL-BD-AP - Banglades…AS9230 - BOL-BD-AP - Bangladesh Online Ltd.AS14789CLOUDFLARENET - Cloud…AS14789 - CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc.AS24556BIJOY-BD-AS-AP - Bijo…AS24556 - BIJOY-BD-AS-AP - Bijoy Online Ltd. Multihome Internet Service ProviderAS138505DNS-AS-AP - DNSBDAS138505 - DNS-AS-AP - DNSBDUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(4)

These ASNs list AS17494 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS9230🇧🇩BOL-BD-AP - Bangladesh Online Ltd.
AS14789🇺🇸CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc.
AS24556🇧🇩BIJOY-BD-AS-AP - Bijoy Online Ltd. Multihome Internet Service Provider
AS138505🇧🇩DNS-AS-AP - DNSBD
About ASPA - what it is and why AS17494 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS17494 (BTTB-AS-AP - Telecom Operator & Internet Service Provider as well) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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