AS198477 ASPA Check - TISGR NET TI SPARKLE GREECE

TISGR-NET TI SPARKLE GREECE SA🇬🇷 - ASPA check for AS198477: the upstream transit providers AS198477 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS198477 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS198477 has not published its own ASPA object, but 5 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
5 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
5

Peering Topology

AS198477 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 5 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS196945, AS197580, AS207767, AS211065, AS212485.AS198477 - TISGR-NET TI SPARKLE GREECE SAAS198477TISGR-NET TI SPARKLE …AS196945MICROBASE-AS Microbas…AS196945 - MICROBASE-AS Microbase PCAS197580AS-CONNECTICORE Conne…AS197580 - AS-CONNECTICORE Connecticore Telecommunications Information Technology S.AAS207767AS_FERMORITE FERMORIT…AS207767 - AS_FERMORITE FERMORITE Systems, Applications and Services on IT and Technology IKEAS211065Anixe_net ANIXE.NET S…AS211065 - Anixe_net ANIXE.NET SINGLE MEMBER PRIVATE COMPANYAS212485SMARTSUPPORT MENELAOS…AS212485 - SMARTSUPPORT MENELAOS KATAKIS KAI SIA LPUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(5)

These ASNs list AS198477 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS196945🇬🇷MICROBASE-AS Microbase PC
AS197580🇬🇷AS-CONNECTICORE Connecticore Telecommunications Information Technology S.A
AS207767🇬🇷AS_FERMORITE FERMORITE Systems, Applications and Services on IT and Technology IKE
AS211065🇬🇷Anixe_net ANIXE.NET SINGLE MEMBER PRIVATE COMPANY
AS212485🇬🇷SMARTSUPPORT MENELAOS KATAKIS KAI SIA LP
About ASPA - what it is and why AS198477 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS198477 (TISGR-NET TI SPARKLE GREECE SA) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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