AS201054 ASPA Check - EPIX PolMix Stowarzyszenie E Poludnie
EPIX-PolMix Stowarzyszenie e-Poludnie🇵🇱 - ASPA check for AS201054: the upstream transit providers AS201054 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS201054 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.
AS201054 has not published its own ASPA object, but 15 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.
Peering Topology
Downstream Customers(15)
These ASNs list AS201054 as an authorized upstream provider.
| ASN | Name |
|---|---|
| AS30813 | 🇵🇱OSTROG-NET-AS Fione Sp. z o.o. |
| AS33901 | 🇵🇱CONNECTA-AS Connecta sp. z o.o. |
| AS33923 | 🇵🇱ART-COM ART-COM Sp. z o.o. |
| AS38942 | 🇵🇱GRONET-AS Centrum Uslug Komputerowych GROT sp. z o.o. |
| AS41931 | 🇵🇱AS-EURONET-PL EURONET NORBERT SANIEWSKI SPOLKA JAWNA |
| AS43171 | 🇵🇱MAXNET Lukasz Rafal Hamerski trading as Maxnet |
| AS48626 | 🇵🇱QUARTO-AS Mediasat s.c. |
| AS57255 | 🇵🇱PLATKOM-AS Piotr Platek trading as Platkom Tele-Informatyka |
| AS59686 | 🇵🇱GEMINI-PL Gemini Internet Sp. z o.o. |
| AS196969 | 🇵🇱MARKOMP-ASN NETFIBER Marcin Wojcik |
About ASPA - what it is and why AS201054 should publish one
ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.
AS201054 (EPIX-PolMix Stowarzyszenie e-Poludnie) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.
Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools
Related Tools and Guides
- How to run an ASPA check - read and verify an ASPA record step by step
- ASPA explained - how provider authorization stops route leaks
- ASPA Check tool - check the ASPA record of any other ASN
- RPKI & ROA Lookup - validate prefixes and check ASPA records for any ASN
- Global ASPA Adoption Statistics - transit-free ASNs, top upstream providers, adoption trends
- AS201054 Overview - prefixes, BGP routes, peers, and RPKI status