AS203291 ASPA Check - FRYSLAN Arend Brouwer

FRYSLAN Arend Brouwer🇳🇱 - ASPA check for AS203291: the upstream transit providers AS203291 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS203291 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS203291 has not published its own ASPA object, but 10 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
10 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
10

Peering Topology

AS203291 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 10 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS197754, AS202585, AS207682, AS211623, AS212635, AS212855, AS213052, AS215296 and more.AS203291 - FRYSLAN Arend BrouwerAS203291FRYSLAN Arend BrouwerAS197754AS-CHRGNL Christiaan …AS197754 - AS-CHRGNL Christiaan GoossensAS202585bgp-rodeo Nick Bouwhu…AS202585 - bgp-rodeo Nick BouwhuisAS207682Maik-Polman Maik Polm…AS207682 - Maik-Polman Maik PolmanAS211623OXAR NAML B.V.AS211623 - OXAR NAML B.V.AS212635AS212635 Jurrian van …AS212635 - AS212635 Jurrian van IerselAS212855AS-LUJE Jelle LuteijnAS212855 - AS-LUJE Jelle LuteijnAS213052BittenBytes Bram Witt…AS213052 - BittenBytes Bram Wittendorp trading as BittenBytesAS215296LOWPING-NL Raoul Brou…AS215296 - LOWPING-NL Raoul Brouns is trading as LowPing NLView all 10 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(10)

These ASNs list AS203291 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS197754🇳🇱AS-CHRGNL Christiaan Goossens
AS202585🇳🇱bgp-rodeo Nick Bouwhuis
AS207682🇳🇱Maik-Polman Maik Polman
AS211623🇳🇱OXAR NAML B.V.
AS212635🇳🇱AS212635 Jurrian van Iersel
AS212855🇳🇱AS-LUJE Jelle Luteijn
AS213052🇳🇱BittenBytes Bram Wittendorp trading as BittenBytes
AS215296🇳🇱LOWPING-NL Raoul Brouns is trading as LowPing NL
AS215665🇩🇪MARLONALKAN-AS Marlon Alkan
AS215842🇳🇱PAAL Erwin Paal
About ASPA - what it is and why AS203291 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS203291 (FRYSLAN Arend Brouwer) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

← Back to AS203291