AS206069 ASPA Check - CORNSEED Limited

CORNSEED Cornseed Limited🇬🇧 - ASPA check for AS206069: the upstream transit providers AS206069 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS206069 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS206069 has not published its own ASPA object, but 11 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
11 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
11

Peering Topology

AS206069 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 11 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS11421, AS40929, AS202335, AS202939, AS203309, AS204211, AS207529, AS210352 and more.AS206069 - CORNSEED Cornseed LimitedAS206069CORNSEED Cornseed Lim…AS11421HYWG-BACKBONE - HYWAS11421 - HYWG-BACKBONE - HYWAS40929MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDoveAS40929 - MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDoveAS202335HAIMA-AS Zhanrui TianAS202335 - HAIMA-AS Zhanrui TianAS202939CHIMON-NETWORK Chimon…AS202939 - CHIMON-NETWORK Chimon Technology LtdAS203309CHOCO-AS Liangyi MaAS203309 - CHOCO-AS Liangyi MaAS204211LOCYAN-NETWORK-AS Sha…AS204211 - LOCYAN-NETWORK-AS Shanghai Yingyun Network Technology Co., Ltd.AS207529NyanLoliNetwork NYANL…AS207529 - NyanLoliNetwork NYANLOLI LTDAS210352YijiaXu Yijia XuAS210352 - YijiaXu Yijia XuView all 11 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(11)

These ASNs list AS206069 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS11421🇺🇸HYWG-BACKBONE - HYW
AS40929🇺🇸MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDove
AS202335🇨🇳HAIMA-AS Zhanrui Tian
AS202939🇬🇧CHIMON-NETWORK Chimon Technology Ltd
AS203309🇨🇳CHOCO-AS Liangyi Ma
AS204211🇨🇳LOCYAN-NETWORK-AS Shanghai Yingyun Network Technology Co., Ltd.
AS207529🇬🇧NyanLoliNetwork NYANLOLI LTD
AS210352🇨🇳YijiaXu Yijia Xu
AS215172🇬🇧JIANYUELAB-AS JIANYUELAB LTD
AS216299🇨🇳LCNET Yang Liuchang
11 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS206069 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS206069 (CORNSEED Cornseed Limited) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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