AS206628 ASPA Check - EzriCloud Tianyu Zhu
EzriCloud Tianyu-Zhu🇺🇸 - ASPA check for AS206628: the upstream transit providers AS206628 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS206628 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.
AS206628 has not published its own ASPA object, but 2 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.
Peering Topology
About ASPA - what it is and why AS206628 should publish one
ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.
AS206628 (EzriCloud Tianyu-Zhu) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.
Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools
Related Tools and Guides
- How to run an ASPA check - read and verify an ASPA record step by step
- ASPA explained - how provider authorization stops route leaks
- ASPA Check tool - check the ASPA record of any other ASN
- RPKI & ROA Lookup - validate prefixes and check ASPA records for any ASN
- Global ASPA Adoption Statistics - transit-free ASNs, top upstream providers, adoption trends
- AS206628 Overview - prefixes, BGP routes, peers, and RPKI status