AS208210 ASPA Check - Servperso Systems Sarah Rossius Trading Servperso Systems

Servperso_Systems Sarah Rossius trading as Servperso Systems🇧🇪 - ASPA check for AS208210: the upstream transit providers AS208210 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS208210 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS208210 has not published its own ASPA object, but 8 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
8 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
8

Peering Topology

AS208210 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 8 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS153176, AS201445, AS214508, AS215207, AS218444, AS218606, AS219488, AS219511.AS208210 - Servperso_Systems Sarah Rossius trading as Servperso SystemsAS208210Servperso_Systems Sar…AS153176PLRM-AS-AP - PT LAPAK…AS153176 - PLRM-AS-AP - PT LAPAK REGISTAR MURAHAS201445Zerval-Network Zerval…AS201445 - Zerval-Network Zerval Network LLCAS214508MANUBRAIBANT Manu Bra…AS214508 - MANUBRAIBANT Manu BraibantAS215207AETHERNET Henrik Van …AS215207 - AETHERNET Henrik Van TassellAS218444AS218444 Muhammet Ere…AS218444 - AS218444 Muhammet Eren KaramanAS218606OECHSLER Samuel Oechs…AS218606 - OECHSLER Samuel OechslerAS219488Fidelir Fidelir SRLAS219488 - Fidelir Fidelir SRLAS219511BE-SERGEKRIER-2026060…AS219511 - BE-SERGEKRIER-20260605 Serge KrierUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(8)

These ASNs list AS208210 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS153176🇮🇩PLRM-AS-AP - PT LAPAK REGISTAR MURAH
AS201445🇺🇸Zerval-Network Zerval Network LLC
AS214508🇧🇪MANUBRAIBANT Manu Braibant
AS215207🇺🇸AETHERNET Henrik Van Tassell
AS218444🇹🇷AS218444 Muhammet Eren Karaman
AS218606🇩🇪OECHSLER Samuel Oechsler
AS219488🇲🇩Fidelir Fidelir SRL
AS219511🇧🇪BE-SERGEKRIER-20260605 Serge Krier
About ASPA - what it is and why AS208210 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS208210 (Servperso_Systems Sarah Rossius trading as Servperso Systems) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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