AS208753 ASPA Check - NETSIX Marco D'Angelo

NETSIX Marco d'Angelo🇮🇹 - ASPA check for AS208753: the upstream transit providers AS208753 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS208753 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS208753 has not published its own ASPA object, but 6 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
6 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
6

Peering Topology

AS208753 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 6 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS6517, AS199183, AS201445, AS215795, AS215899, AS215956.AS208753 - NETSIX Marco dAngeloAS208753NETSIX Marco dAngeloAS6517LAKENETWORKS-AS - LAK…AS6517 - LAKENETWORKS-AS - LAKENETWORKSAS199183Arjen-Essink Arjen Ol…AS199183 - Arjen-Essink Arjen Olaf EssinkAS201445Zerval-Network Zerval…AS201445 - Zerval-Network Zerval Network LLCAS215795DamiNet Antonios Dami…AS215795 - DamiNet Antonios DamigosAS215899GUDIS-NET Justas Gudy…AS215899 - GUDIS-NET Justas GudynasAS215956MYIP-AS Dennis de Hou…AS215956 - MYIP-AS Dennis de Houx trading as All In OneUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(6)

These ASNs list AS208753 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS6517🇺🇸LAKENETWORKS-AS - LAKENETWORKS
AS199183🇳🇱Arjen-Essink Arjen Olaf Essink
AS201445🇺🇸Zerval-Network Zerval Network LLC
AS215795🇬🇷DamiNet Antonios Damigos
AS215899🇱🇹GUDIS-NET Justas Gudynas
AS215956🇧🇪MYIP-AS Dennis de Houx trading as All In One
About ASPA - what it is and why AS208753 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS208753 (NETSIX Marco d'Angelo) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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