AS209533 ASPA Check - BGPTunnel IFog

BGPTunnel iFog GmbH🇨🇭 - ASPA check for AS209533: the upstream transit providers AS209533 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS209533 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS209533 has not published its own ASPA object, but 116 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
116 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
116

Peering Topology

AS209533 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 116 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS41047, AS60900, AS197658, AS197885, AS198016, AS199012, AS199109, AS199183 and more.AS209533 - BGPTunnel iFog GmbHAS209533BGPTunnel iFog GmbHAS41047NL-MLAB Bart VranckenAS41047 - NL-MLAB Bart VranckenAS60900SsmidgeTechnologies A…AS60900 - SsmidgeTechnologies Adrian Trifonov trading as Ssmidge TechnologiesAS197658KBEUG-NETWORK Konstan…AS197658 - KBEUG-NETWORK Konstantin BeugAS197885EST-IT Erik StompAS197885 - EST-IT Erik StompAS198016KSS Michael KieserAS198016 - KSS Michael KieserAS199012KITE Emil KittiAS199012 - KITE Emil KittiAS199109FruburyNet Guy Fenn-N…AS199109 - FruburyNet Guy Fenn-NewburyAS199183Arjen-Essink Arjen Ol…AS199183 - Arjen-Essink Arjen Olaf EssinkView all 116 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(116)

These ASNs list AS209533 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS41047🇳🇱NL-MLAB Bart Vrancken
AS60900🇨🇦SsmidgeTechnologies Adrian Trifonov trading as Ssmidge Technologies
AS197658🇩🇪KBEUG-NETWORK Konstantin Beug
AS197885🇩🇪EST-IT Erik Stomp
AS198016🇩🇪KSS Michael Kieser
AS199012🇸🇪KITE Emil Kitti
AS199109🇬🇧FruburyNet Guy Fenn-Newbury
AS199183🇳🇱Arjen-Essink Arjen Olaf Essink
AS199395🇩🇪Karagoez Adem Karagoez
AS199518🇺🇸GSHAPIRO-AS Gregory Shapiro
116 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS209533 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS209533 (BGPTunnel iFog GmbH) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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