AS210233 ASPA Check - Pixinko SARL

Pixinko Pixinko SARL🇧🇪 - ASPA check for AS210233: the upstream transit providers AS210233 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS210233 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS210233 has not published its own ASPA object, but 13 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
13 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
13

Peering Topology

AS210233 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 13 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS153176, AS201445, AS201853, AS209018, AS214508, AS215097, AS218357, AS218444 and more.AS210233 - Pixinko Pixinko SARLAS210233Pixinko Pixinko SARLAS153176PLRM-AS-AP - PT LAPAK…AS153176 - PLRM-AS-AP - PT LAPAK REGISTAR MURAHAS201445Zerval-Network Zerval…AS201445 - Zerval-Network Zerval Network LLCAS201853CatgirlCloud Sophie R…AS201853 - CatgirlCloud Sophie Raven TauchertAS209018FALIX SIA Baltijas Pa…AS209018 - FALIX SIA Baltijas PakalpojumiAS214508MANUBRAIBANT Manu Bra…AS214508 - MANUBRAIBANT Manu BraibantAS215097SYSTEMDYNAMICS SYSTEM…AS215097 - SYSTEMDYNAMICS SYSTEM DYNAMICS SARLAS218357STREET-AS Streethosti…AS218357 - STREET-AS Streethosting LTDAAS218444AS218444 Muhammet Ere…AS218444 - AS218444 Muhammet Eren KaramanView all 13 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(13)

These ASNs list AS210233 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS153176🇮🇩PLRM-AS-AP - PT LAPAK REGISTAR MURAH
AS201445🇺🇸Zerval-Network Zerval Network LLC
AS201853🇩🇪CatgirlCloud Sophie Raven Tauchert
AS209018🇱🇻FALIX SIA Baltijas Pakalpojumi
AS214508🇧🇪MANUBRAIBANT Manu Braibant
AS215097🇫🇷SYSTEMDYNAMICS SYSTEM DYNAMICS SARL
AS218357🇧🇷STREET-AS Streethosting LTDA
AS218444🇹🇷AS218444 Muhammet Eren Karaman
AS218606🇩🇪OECHSLER Samuel Oechsler
AS218928🇩🇪CARLFISCHER Carl Fischer
13 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS210233 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS210233 (Pixinko Pixinko SARL) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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