AS212396 ASPA Check - FYFEWEB

FYFEWEB FyfeWeb Ltd🇬🇧 - ASPA check for AS212396: the upstream transit providers AS212396 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS212396 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS212396 has not published its own ASPA object, but 8 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
8 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
8

Peering Topology

AS212396 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 8 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS198276, AS198741, AS200027, AS201616, AS212683, AS213576, AS214480, AS218805.AS212396 - FYFEWEB FyfeWeb LtdAS212396FYFEWEB FyfeWeb LtdAS198276ARPERLA Jordan RobertAS198276 - ARPERLA Jordan RobertAS198741AMELIAK Amelia Kalino…AS198741 - AMELIAK Amelia KalinowskaAS200027RDA-TELECOM RDA GROUP…AS200027 - RDA-TELECOM RDA GROUP LIMITEDAS201616theoh-as Theo HolroydAS201616 - theoh-as Theo HolroydAS212683OLILO-AS Olilo UK Ir…AS212683 - OLILO-AS Olilo UK Ireland Ltd.AS213576ERTIUS-NET Robert WeirAS213576 - ERTIUS-NET Robert WeirAS214480Innova-Communications…AS214480 - Innova-Communications Innova Communications LimitedAS218805STACKLAYER-LTD Stackl…AS218805 - STACKLAYER-LTD Stacklayer Communications LimitedUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(8)

These ASNs list AS212396 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS198276🇬🇧ARPERLA Jordan Robert
AS198741🇬🇧AMELIAK Amelia Kalinowska
AS200027🇬🇧RDA-TELECOM RDA GROUP LIMITED
AS201616🇬🇧theoh-as Theo Holroyd
AS212683🇬🇧OLILO-AS Olilo UK & Ireland Ltd.
AS213576🇮🇪ERTIUS-NET Robert Weir
AS214480🇬🇧Innova-Communications Innova Communications Limited
AS218805🇬🇧STACKLAYER-LTD Stacklayer Communications Limited
About ASPA - what it is and why AS212396 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS212396 (FYFEWEB FyfeWeb Ltd) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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