AS214439 ASPA Check - ZXCT Zhuhai Xiyun Cloud Technology

ZXCT-AS Zhuhai Xiyun Cloud Technology Co., Ltd.🇨🇳 - ASPA check for AS214439: the upstream transit providers AS214439 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS214439 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS214439 has not published its own ASPA object, but 8 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
8 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
8

Peering Topology

AS214439 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 8 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS40929, AS53808, AS199310, AS207303, AS207529, AS211575, AS211729, AS214933.AS214439 - ZXCT-AS Zhuhai Xiyun Cloud Technology Co., Ltd.AS214439ZXCT-AS Zhuhai Xiyun …AS40929MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDoveAS40929 - MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDoveAS53808MOEDOVE-N2 - MoeDoveAS53808 - MOEDOVE-N2 - MoeDoveAS199310QFLink-AS XIN BING XI…AS199310 - QFLink-AS XIN BING XIANAS207303AYUMU-NETWORK Xilin X…AS207303 - AYUMU-NETWORK Xilin XieAS207529NyanLoliNetwork NYANL…AS207529 - NyanLoliNetwork NYANLOLI LTDAS211575RuiNetwork Rui FengAS211575 - RuiNetwork Rui FengAS211729BAIYUEXIAO-AS Yiming …AS211729 - BAIYUEXIAO-AS Yiming ZhangAS214933BAKAPUB-NETWORK Bingx…AS214933 - BAKAPUB-NETWORK Bingxin LiuUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(8)

These ASNs list AS214439 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS40929🇺🇸MOEDOVE-BN - MoeDove
AS53808🇺🇸MOEDOVE-N2 - MoeDove
AS199310🇨🇳QFLink-AS XIN BING XIAN
AS207303🇨🇳AYUMU-NETWORK Xilin Xie
AS207529🇬🇧NyanLoliNetwork NYANLOLI LTD
AS211575🇨🇳RuiNetwork Rui Feng
AS211729🇺🇸BAIYUEXIAO-AS Yiming Zhang
AS214933🇨🇳BAKAPUB-NETWORK Bingxin Liu
About ASPA - what it is and why AS214439 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS214439 (ZXCT-AS Zhuhai Xiyun Cloud Technology Co., Ltd.) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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