AS215030 ASPA Check - AspireHosting Budankailu Namrata Patra Trading AspireHosting

AspireHosting Budankailu Namrata Patra trading as AspireHosting🇮🇳 - ASPA check for AS215030: the upstream transit providers AS215030 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS215030 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS215030 has not published its own ASPA object, but 8 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
8 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
8

Peering Topology

AS215030 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 8 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS199746, AS204464, AS205941, AS218470, AS218471, AS218832, AS218904, AS219157.AS215030 - AspireHosting Budankailu Namrata Patra trading as AspireHostingAS215030AspireHosting Budanka…AS199746NextServ NextServ LLCAS199746 - NextServ NextServ LLCAS204464NEXTSERV NextServ LLCAS204464 - NEXTSERV NextServ LLCAS205941LSG Lungu Stefan Gabr…AS205941 - LSG Lungu Stefan GabrielAS218470FRANKE-CAPITAL Franke…AS218470 - FRANKE-CAPITAL Franke Capital GmbHAS218471WIRENOW wirenow UGAS218471 - WIRENOW wirenow UGAS218832NEXTSERV NextServ UGAS218832 - NEXTSERV NextServ UGAS218904NEXTIX NextIX UGAS218904 - NEXTIX NextIX UGAS219157GCS Global Capital Se…AS219157 - GCS Global Capital Services Ltd.UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(8)

These ASNs list AS215030 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS199746🇺🇸NextServ NextServ LLC
AS204464🇺🇸NEXTSERV NextServ LLC
AS205941🇷🇴LSG Lungu Stefan Gabriel
AS218470🇩🇪FRANKE-CAPITAL Franke Capital GmbH
AS218471🇩🇪WIRENOW wirenow UG
AS218832🇩🇪NEXTSERV NextServ UG
AS218904🇩🇪NEXTIX NextIX UG
AS219157🇬🇧GCS Global Capital Services Ltd.
About ASPA - what it is and why AS215030 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS215030 (AspireHosting Budankailu Namrata Patra trading as AspireHosting) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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