AS21859 ASPA Check - Zenlayer

ZEN-ECN - Zenlayer Inc🇺🇸 - ASPA check for AS21859: the upstream transit providers AS21859 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS21859 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS21859 has not published its own ASPA object, but 8 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
8 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
8

Peering Topology

AS21859 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 8 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS44578, AS47583, AS135244, AS138128, AS199180, AS200325, AS211575, AS402336.AS21859 - ZEN-ECN - Zenlayer IncAS21859ZEN-ECN - Zenlayer IncAS44578ITGLOBALCOM-DMCC ITGL…AS44578 - ITGLOBALCOM-DMCC ITGLOBAL COM DMCCAS47583AS-HOSTINGER Hostinge…AS47583 - AS-HOSTINGER Hostinger International LimitedAS135244KNET-AS - Kedia Inter…AS135244 - KNET-AS - Kedia Internet Private LimitedAS138128SOLNET-ID - PT Solnet…AS138128 - SOLNET-ID - PT Solnet IndonesiaAS199180LAGOM-NET Lagom Produ…AS199180 - LAGOM-NET Lagom Products LLCAS200325BunnyCDN BUNNYWAY, in…AS200325 - BunnyCDN BUNNYWAY, informacijske storitve d.o.o.AS211575RuiNetwork Rui FengAS211575 - RuiNetwork Rui FengAS402336CHICFINDS - CHICFINDSAS402336 - CHICFINDS - CHICFINDSUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(8)

These ASNs list AS21859 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS44578🇦🇪ITGLOBALCOM-DMCC ITGLOBAL COM DMCC
AS47583🇨🇾AS-HOSTINGER Hostinger International Limited
AS135244KNET-AS - Kedia Internet Private Limited
AS138128SOLNET-ID - PT Solnet Indonesia
AS199180🇦🇲LAGOM-NET Lagom Products LLC
AS200325🇸🇮BunnyCDN BUNNYWAY, informacijske storitve d.o.o.
AS211575🇨🇳RuiNetwork Rui Feng
AS402336🇺🇸CHICFINDS - CHICFINDS
About ASPA - what it is and why AS21859 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS21859 (ZEN-ECN - Zenlayer Inc) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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