AS219331 ASPA Check - FreePKT Thomas BOUZIN

FreePKT Thomas BOUZIN🇫🇷 - ASPA check for AS219331: the upstream transit providers AS219331 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS219331 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS219331 has not published its own ASPA object, but 7 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
7 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
7

Peering Topology

AS219331 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 7 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS41047, AS199518, AS201398, AS203868, AS207445, AS216367, AS401113.AS219331 - FreePKT Thomas BOUZINAS219331FreePKT Thomas BOUZINAS41047NL-MLAB Bart VranckenAS41047 - NL-MLAB Bart VranckenAS199518GSHAPIRO-AS Gregory S…AS199518 - GSHAPIRO-AS Gregory ShapiroAS201398AS201398-NETWORK Guwi…AS201398 - AS201398-NETWORK Guwin Universal Services LLCAS203868RAPDODGENET-ID Rifqi …AS203868 - RAPDODGENET-ID Rifqi Arief PamungkasAS207445AS_VAMH Vincent MarounAS207445 - AS_VAMH Vincent MarounAS216367FUSSELIG Tim OberthuerAS216367 - FUSSELIG Tim OberthuerAS401113SCH-TEST-AS - RackGen…AS401113 - SCH-TEST-AS - RackGeniusUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(7)

These ASNs list AS219331 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS41047🇳🇱NL-MLAB Bart Vrancken
AS199518🇺🇸GSHAPIRO-AS Gregory Shapiro
AS201398🇺🇸AS201398-NETWORK Guwin Universal Services LLC
AS203868🇮🇩RAPDODGENET-ID Rifqi Arief Pamungkas
AS207445🇱🇧AS_VAMH Vincent Maroun
AS216367🇩🇪FUSSELIG Tim Oberthuer
AS401113🇺🇸SCH-TEST-AS - RackGenius
About ASPA - what it is and why AS219331 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS219331 (FreePKT Thomas BOUZIN) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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