AS22381 ASPA Check - SAMM TECNOLOGIA E TELECOMUNICACOES S.A

AS22381 - SAMM TECNOLOGIA E TELECOMUNICACOES S.A🇧🇷 - ASPA check for AS22381: the upstream transit providers AS22381 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS22381 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS22381 has not published its own ASPA object, but 3 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
3 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
3

Peering Topology

AS22381 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 3 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS28254, AS270631, AS273709.AS22381 - AS22381 - SAMM TECNOLOGIA E TELECOMUNICACOES S.AAS22381AS22381 - SAMM TECNOL…AS28254AS28254 - Arganet Com…AS28254 - AS28254 - Arganet Comunicacao e Monitoramento Digital LtdaAS270631AS270631 - Totvs S.A.AS270631 - AS270631 - Totvs S.A.AS273709AS273709 - MR Serv In…AS273709 - AS273709 - MR Serv Internet e TV por AssinaturaUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(3)

These ASNs list AS22381 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS28254🇧🇷AS28254 - Arganet Comunicacao e Monitoramento Digital Ltda
AS270631🇧🇷AS270631 - Totvs S.A.
AS273709🇧🇷AS273709 - MR Serv Internet e TV por Assinatura
About ASPA - what it is and why AS22381 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS22381 (AS22381 - SAMM TECNOLOGIA E TELECOMUNICACOES S.A) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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