AS24381 ASPA Check - BGP.Exchange

BGPE-AS - BGP.Exchange🇦🇺 - ASPA check for AS24381: the upstream transit providers AS24381 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS24381 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS24381 has not published its own ASPA object, but 13 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
13 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
13

Peering Topology

AS24381 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 13 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS31184, AS57027, AS197946, AS199890, AS200790, AS201371, AS208487, AS212037 and more.AS24381 - BGPE-AS - BGP.ExchangeAS24381BGPE-AS - BGP.ExchangeAS31184MBNET-AS Michael Buss…AS31184 - MBNET-AS Michael BussmannAS57027aria Aria Jahangiri F…AS57027 - aria Aria Jahangiri FarAS197946AnyCast Amnpardaz Sof…AS197946 - AnyCast Amnpardaz Soft CorporationAS199890MINHNG99 Nguyen Quang…AS199890 - MINHNG99 Nguyen Quang MinhAS200790BYTEFIZZ BYTEFIZZ LLCAS200790 - BYTEFIZZ BYTEFIZZ LLCAS201371ERHARDT-SYSTEMS Lars …AS201371 - ERHARDT-SYSTEMS Lars Peter Werner ErhardtAS208487ShapeShifter HASAN CA…AS208487 - ShapeShifter HASAN CAGRI AKSUAS212037PROVOST-INFO Marc Pro…AS212037 - PROVOST-INFO Marc ProvostView all 13 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(13)

These ASNs list AS24381 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS31184🇩🇪MBNET-AS Michael Bussmann
AS57027🇮🇷aria Aria Jahangiri Far
AS197946🇮🇷AnyCast Amnpardaz Soft Corporation
AS199890🇻🇳MINHNG99 Nguyen Quang Minh
AS200790🇺🇸BYTEFIZZ BYTEFIZZ LLC
AS201371🇩🇪ERHARDT-SYSTEMS Lars Peter Werner Erhardt
AS208487🇹🇷ShapeShifter HASAN CAGRI AKSU
AS212037🇫🇷PROVOST-INFO Marc Provost
AS214763🇺🇸Akshay-Revankar Akshay Revankar
AS216096🇦🇩SECUREPEAK Alex Terrats Ciberseguretat SLU
13 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS24381 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS24381 (BGPE-AS - BGP.Exchange) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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