AS29169 ASPA Check - GANDI SAS

GANDI-AS GANDI SAS🇫🇷 - ASPA check for AS29169: the upstream transit providers AS29169 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS29169 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS29169 has not published its own ASPA object, but 1 ASN lists it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
1 ASN
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
1

Peering Topology

AS29169 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 1 downstream customerNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS34019.AS29169 - GANDI-AS GANDI SASAS29169GANDI-AS GANDI SASAS34019HIVANE Hivane Associa…AS34019 - HIVANE Hivane AssociationUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(1)

These ASNs list AS29169 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS34019🇫🇷HIVANE Hivane Association
About ASPA - what it is and why AS29169 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS29169 (GANDI-AS GANDI SAS) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

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