AS31561 ASPA Check - NINE IX MOJI SAS

NINE-IX MOJI SAS🇫🇷 - ASPA check for AS31561: the upstream transit providers AS31561 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS31561 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS31561 has not published its own ASPA object, but 6 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
6 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
6

Peering Topology

AS31561 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 6 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS62000, AS210578, AS214380, AS215760, AS215828, AS216096.AS31561 - NINE-IX MOJI SASAS31561NINE-IX MOJI SASAS62000AS62000 SERVERD SASAS62000 - AS62000 SERVERD SASAS210578NeNet Niels Groeneweg…AS210578 - NeNet Niels Groenewegen trading as NeNetAS214380TIM427 Tim de Boer tr…AS214380 - TIM427 Tim de Boer trading as tim427.netAS215760DISPAISY-AS Adam Graz…AS215760 - DISPAISY-AS Adam GrazioliAS215828TMW-Global-Networks T…AS215828 - TMW-Global-Networks Tizian Maxime Weigt trading as TMW Global NetworksAS216096SECUREPEAK Alex Terra…AS216096 - SECUREPEAK Alex Terrats Ciberseguretat SLUUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(6)

These ASNs list AS31561 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS62000🇫🇷AS62000 SERVERD SAS
AS210578🇳🇱NeNet Niels Groenewegen trading as NeNet
AS214380🇳🇱TIM427 Tim de Boer trading as tim427.net
AS215760🇮🇹DISPAISY-AS Adam Grazioli
AS215828🇩🇪TMW-Global-Networks Tizian Maxime Weigt trading as "TMW Global Networks"
AS216096🇦🇩SECUREPEAK Alex Terrats Ciberseguretat SLU
About ASPA - what it is and why AS31561 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS31561 (NINE-IX MOJI SAS) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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