AS3204 ASPA Check - XTOM V PS XTom OU

XTOM-V-PS xTom OU🇪🇪 - ASPA check for AS3204: the upstream transit providers AS3204 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS3204 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS3204 has not published its own ASPA object, but 13 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
13 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
13

Peering Topology

AS3204 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 13 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS10779, AS23347, AS30114, AS44324, AS51087, AS57934, AS62246, AS199310 and more.AS3204 - XTOM-V-PS xTom OUAS3204XTOM-V-PS xTom OUAS10779STEPBROBD - StepBroBD…AS10779 - STEPBROBD - StepBroBD, Inc.AS23347ZYC - ZYC Network LLCAS23347 - ZYC - ZYC Network LLCAS30114DECIMA-LLC - Decima L…AS30114 - DECIMA-LLC - Decima LLCAS44324MOEDOVE-AS MoeDove LLCAS44324 - MOEDOVE-AS MoeDove LLCAS51087BLING-AS Bling Networ…AS51087 - BLING-AS Bling Network LtdAS57934WJY-AS WJY OUAS57934 - WJY-AS WJY OUAS62246WJY-AS WJY LimitedAS62246 - WJY-AS WJY LimitedAS199310QFLink-AS XIN BING XI…AS199310 - QFLink-AS XIN BING XIANView all 13 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(13)

These ASNs list AS3204 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS10779🇺🇸STEPBROBD - StepBroBD, Inc.
AS23347🇺🇸ZYC - ZYC Network LLC
AS30114🇺🇸DECIMA-LLC - Decima LLC
AS44324🇺🇸MOEDOVE-AS MoeDove LLC
AS51087🇬🇧BLING-AS Bling Network Ltd
AS57934🇪🇪WJY-AS WJY OU
AS62246🇬🇧WJY-AS WJY Limited
AS199310🇨🇳QFLink-AS XIN BING XIAN
AS200455🇬🇧HOTARU-AS HOTARU NETWORK LTD.
AS202782🇨🇳EverLink-AS Yaoheng Digital (Shanghai) Technology Co., Ltd.
13 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS3204 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS3204 (XTOM-V-PS xTom OU) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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