AS32505 ASPA Check - Conterra

DWL-MAIN - Conterra🇺🇸 - ASPA check for AS32505: the upstream transit providers AS32505 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS32505 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS32505 has not published its own ASPA object, but 6 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
6 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
6

Peering Topology

AS32505 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 6 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS18981, AS23228, AS36858, AS397886, AS401111, AS402360.AS32505 - DWL-MAIN - ConterraAS32505DWL-MAIN - ConterraAS18981SUPERNET-II - SUPERNe…AS18981 - SUPERNET-II - SUPERNet IIAS23228AS1-CO-EL-PASO-TX - T…AS23228 - AS1-CO-EL-PASO-TX - The County of El PasoAS36858NMSTN - Office of Bro…AS36858 - NMSTN - Office of Broadband Access and ExpansionAS397886SUPERNET - SUPERNetAS397886 - SUPERNET - SUPERNetAS401111WAVEPOINT - Wavepoint…AS401111 - WAVEPOINT - Wavepoint LLCAS402360BRFLASHV - BRFAS402360 - BRFLASHV - BRFUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(6)

These ASNs list AS32505 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS18981🇺🇸SUPERNET-II - SUPERNet II
AS23228🇺🇸AS1-CO-EL-PASO-TX - The County of El Paso
AS36858🇺🇸NMSTN - Office of Broadband Access and Expansion
AS397886🇺🇸SUPERNET - SUPERNet
AS401111🇺🇸WAVEPOINT - Wavepoint LLC
AS402360🇺🇸BRFLASHV - BRF
About ASPA - what it is and why AS32505 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS32505 (DWL-MAIN - Conterra) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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