AS37468 ASPA Check - Angola Cables Angola Cables

Angola Cables - Angola Cables🇦🇴 - ASPA check for AS37468: the upstream transit providers AS37468 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS37468 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS37468 has not published its own ASPA object, but 10 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
10 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
10

Peering Topology

AS37468 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 10 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS14789, AS18001, AS60503, AS61573, AS61625, AS63989, AS131314, AS142631 and more.AS37468 - Angola Cables - Angola CablesAS37468Angola Cables - Angol…AS14789CLOUDFLARENET - Cloud…AS14789 - CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc.AS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS60503FNXTEC FNX Tecnologia…AS60503 - FNXTEC FNX Tecnologia LTDAAS61573AS61573 - IP TELECOMAS61573 - AS61573 - IP TELECOMAS61625AS61625 - Grupo We De…AS61625 - AS61625 - Grupo We Dev LTDAAS63989DE-CORP - DE-CORPAS63989 - DE-CORP - DE-CORPAS131314CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech …AS131314 - CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International LimitedAS142631METRO-AS-AP - Metro L…AS142631 - METRO-AS-AP - Metro LightspeedView all 10 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(10)

These ASNs list AS37468 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS14789🇺🇸CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc.
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS60503🇧🇷FNXTEC FNX Tecnologia LTDA
AS61573🇧🇷AS61573 - IP TELECOM
AS61625🇧🇷AS61625 - Grupo We Dev LTDA
AS63989🇹🇭DE-CORP - DE-CORP
AS131314🇭🇰CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International Limited
AS142631🇲🇾METRO-AS-AP - Metro Lightspeed
AS262494🇧🇷AS262494 - Virtex Telecom
AS269688🇧🇷AS269688 - ITATIAIA INFORMATICA E TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA ME
About ASPA - what it is and why AS37468 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS37468 (Angola Cables - Angola Cables) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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