AS38195 ASPA Check - Superloop

SUPERLOOP-AS-AP - Superloop🇦🇺 - ASPA check for AS38195: the upstream transit providers AS38195 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS38195 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS38195 has not published its own ASPA object, but 8 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
8 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
8

Peering Topology

AS38195 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 8 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS10234, AS22672, AS45437, AS133382, AS134143, AS134697, AS140643, AS153315.AS38195 - SUPERLOOP-AS-AP - SuperloopAS38195SUPERLOOP-AS-AP - Sup…AS10234Zurich-Australia-AS-A…AS10234 - Zurich-Australia-AS-AP - Zurich Financial Services AustraliaAS22672PDKPL-AS-AP - Kinetix…AS22672 - PDKPL-AS-AP - Kinetix NetworksAS45437RWTS-AS-AP - Real Wor…AS45437 - RWTS-AS-AP - Real World - The CoreAS133382TBDN-AS-AP - THE BUSI…AS133382 - TBDN-AS-AP - THE BUSINESS DOCTOR NSW PTY LTDAS134143PDKPL-AS-AP - Kinetix…AS134143 - PDKPL-AS-AP - Kinetix NetworksAS134697LAUNTEL-AS-AP - Launt…AS134697 - LAUNTEL-AS-AP - LauntelAS140643NETBRIGHT-AS-AP - Net…AS140643 - NETBRIGHT-AS-AP - NetbrightAS153315UNIBEAM-AS-AP - Unibe…AS153315 - UNIBEAM-AS-AP - Unibeam Networks Pty LtdUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(8)

These ASNs list AS38195 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS10234🇦🇺Zurich-Australia-AS-AP - Zurich Financial Services Australia
AS22672🇦🇺PDKPL-AS-AP - Kinetix Networks
AS45437🇦🇺RWTS-AS-AP - Real World - The Core
AS133382🇦🇺TBDN-AS-AP - THE BUSINESS DOCTOR NSW PTY LTD
AS134143🇦🇺PDKPL-AS-AP - Kinetix Networks
AS134697🇦🇺LAUNTEL-AS-AP - Launtel
AS140643🇦🇺NETBRIGHT-AS-AP - Netbright
AS153315🇦🇺UNIBEAM-AS-AP - Unibeam Networks Pty Ltd
About ASPA - what it is and why AS38195 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS38195 (SUPERLOOP-AS-AP - Superloop) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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