AS39351 ASPA Check - ESAB 31173 Services AB

ESAB-AS 31173 Services AB🇸🇪 - ASPA check for AS39351: the upstream transit providers AS39351 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS39351 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS39351 has not published its own ASPA object, but 8 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
8 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
8

Peering Topology

AS39351 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 8 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS18001, AS24492, AS41051, AS131314, AS142631, AS199656, AS201616, AS214365.AS39351 - ESAB-AS 31173 Services ABAS39351ESAB-AS 31173 Service…AS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS24492IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiC…AS24492 - IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiCAM Corporation Ltd.AS41051FREETRANSIT Openfacto…AS41051 - FREETRANSIT Openfactory GmbHAS131314CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech …AS131314 - CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International LimitedAS142631METRO-AS-AP - Metro L…AS142631 - METRO-AS-AP - Metro LightspeedAS199656Zyner ZynerAS199656 - Zyner ZynerAS201616theoh-as Theo HolroydAS201616 - theoh-as Theo HolroydAS214365HypefoxNet Hypefox ABAS214365 - HypefoxNet Hypefox ABUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(8)

These ASNs list AS39351 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS24492🇰🇭IIT-WICAM-AS-AP - WiCAM Corporation Ltd.
AS41051🇨🇭FREETRANSIT Openfactory GmbH
AS131314🇭🇰CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International Limited
AS142631🇲🇾METRO-AS-AP - Metro Lightspeed
AS199656🇸🇪Zyner Zyner
AS201616🇬🇧theoh-as Theo Holroyd
AS214365🇸🇪HypefoxNet Hypefox AB
About ASPA - what it is and why AS39351 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS39351 (ESAB-AS 31173 Services AB) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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