AS43766 ASPA Check - MTC KSA Mobile Telecommunication Company Saudi Arabia Joint Stock Company

MTC-KSA-AS Mobile Telecommunication Company Saudi Arabia Joint-Stock company🇸🇦 - ASPA check for AS43766: the upstream transit providers AS43766 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS43766 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS43766 has not published its own ASPA object, but 3 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
3 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
3

Peering Topology

AS43766 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 3 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS49833, AS61073, AS215442.AS43766 - MTC-KSA-AS Mobile Telecommunication Company Saudi Arabia Joint-Stock companyAS43766MTC-KSA-AS Mobile Tel…AS49833GAMEP National Center…AS49833 - GAMEP National Center for MeteorologyAS61073neoleap Global Financ…AS61073 - neoleap Global Financial Digital Solution Company JSCAS215442neveltech Al-marhalla…AS215442 - neveltech Al-marhalla Al-taliya Information Technology Holding Company LtdUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(3)

These ASNs list AS43766 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS49833🇸🇦GAMEP National Center for Meteorology
AS61073🇸🇦neoleap Global Financial Digital Solution Company JSC
AS215442🇸🇦neveltech Al-marhalla Al-taliya Information Technology Holding Company Ltd
About ASPA - what it is and why AS43766 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS43766 (MTC-KSA-AS Mobile Telecommunication Company Saudi Arabia Joint-Stock company) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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