AS4455 ASPA Check - BSO IX Reach

BSO IX Reach Ltd🇬🇧 - ASPA check for AS4455: the upstream transit providers AS4455 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS4455 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS4455 has not published its own ASPA object, but 7 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
7 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
7

Peering Topology

AS4455 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 7 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS1200, AS18001, AS38016, AS49935, AS60331, AS131314, AS142631.AS4455 - BSO IX Reach LtdAS4455BSO IX Reach LtdAS1200AMS-IX1 Amsterdam Int…AS1200 - AMS-IX1 Amsterdam Internet Exchange B.V.AS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS38016NOK-IP-NET-LABS - Nok…AS38016 - NOK-IP-NET-LABS - Nokia IP Networks LabsAS49935SmartEye SmartEye B.VAS49935 - SmartEye SmartEye B.VAS60331VINC-AS Une Vision No…AS60331 - VINC-AS Une Vision Nouvelle de la Communication VINC SASAS131314CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech …AS131314 - CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International LimitedAS142631METRO-AS-AP - Metro L…AS142631 - METRO-AS-AP - Metro LightspeedUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(7)

These ASNs list AS4455 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS1200🇳🇱AMS-IX1 Amsterdam Internet Exchange B.V.
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS38016🇦🇺NOK-IP-NET-LABS - Nokia IP Networks Labs
AS49935🇧🇪SmartEye SmartEye B.V
AS60331🇫🇷VINC-AS Une Vision Nouvelle de la Communication VINC SAS
AS131314🇭🇰CBC-AS-AP - CBC Tech International Limited
AS142631🇲🇾METRO-AS-AP - Metro Lightspeed
About ASPA - what it is and why AS4455 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS4455 (BSO IX Reach Ltd) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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