AS4635 ASPA Check - HKIX RS1 Hong Kong Internet Exchange Route Server 1

HKIX-RS1 Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1🇭🇰 - ASPA check for AS4635: the upstream transit providers AS4635 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS4635 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS4635 has not published its own ASPA object, but 5 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
5 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
5

Peering Topology

AS4635 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 5 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS7629, AS23930, AS24221, AS38491, AS131314.AS4635 - HKIX-RS1 Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1AS4635HKIX-RS1 Hong Kong In…AS7629EPLDT-AS-AP 5F L.V. L…AS7629 - EPLDT-AS-AP 5F L.V. Locsin BldgAS23930VITROINC-AS-AP VITRO …AS23930 - VITROINC-AS-AP VITRO INC.AS24221EPLDT-AZURE-STACK ePL…AS24221 - EPLDT-AZURE-STACK ePLDT Azure StackAS38491VITROINC-AS-AP VITRO …AS38491 - VITROINC-AS-AP VITRO INC.AS131314CBC-AS-AP CBC Tech In…AS131314 - CBC-AS-AP CBC Tech International LimitedUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(5)

These ASNs list AS4635 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS7629🇵🇭EPLDT-AS-AP 5F L.V. Locsin Bldg
AS23930🇵🇭VITROINC-AS-AP VITRO INC.
AS24221🇵🇭EPLDT-AZURE-STACK ePLDT Azure Stack
AS38491🇵🇭VITROINC-AS-AP VITRO INC.
AS131314🇭🇰CBC-AS-AP CBC Tech International Limited
About ASPA - what it is and why AS4635 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS4635 (HKIX-RS1 Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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