AS4637 ASPA Check - Telstra Global

ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global🇭🇰 - ASPA check for AS4637: the upstream transit providers AS4637 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS4637 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS4637 has not published its own ASPA object, but 13 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
13 ASNs
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
13

Peering Topology

AS4637 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 13 downstream customersNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS1221, AS7629, AS18001, AS19651, AS23930, AS24221, AS38491, AS45177 and more.AS4637 - ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra GlobalAS4637ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - …AS1221ASN-TELSTRA - Telstra…AS1221 - ASN-TELSTRA - Telstra LimitedAS7629EPLDT-AS-AP - 5F L.V.…AS7629 - EPLDT-AS-AP - 5F L.V. Locsin BldgAS18001DIALOG-AS - Dialog Ax…AS18001 - DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.AS19651TTL-LTD - The Trusty …AS19651 - TTL-LTD - The Trusty Ledger Ltd.AS23930VITROINC-AS-AP - VITR…AS23930 - VITROINC-AS-AP - VITRO INC.AS24221ePLDT-Azure-Stack - e…AS24221 - ePLDT-Azure-Stack - ePLDT Azure StackAS38491VITROINC-AS-AP - VITR…AS38491 - VITROINC-AS-AP - VITRO INC.AS45177DEVOLI-AS-AP - DevoliAS45177 - DEVOLI-AS-AP - DevoliView all 13 downstreams →UPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(13)

These ASNs list AS4637 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS1221🇦🇺ASN-TELSTRA - Telstra Limited
AS7629🇵🇭EPLDT-AS-AP - 5F L.V. Locsin Bldg
AS18001🇱🇰DIALOG-AS - Dialog Axiata PLC.
AS19651🇨🇦TTL-LTD - The Trusty Ledger Ltd.
AS23930🇵🇭VITROINC-AS-AP - VITRO INC.
AS24221🇵🇭ePLDT-Azure-Stack - ePLDT Azure Stack
AS38491🇵🇭VITROINC-AS-AP - VITRO INC.
AS45177🇳🇿DEVOLI-AS-AP - Devoli
AS45355🇫🇯DIGICELPACIFIC-1-AP - Digicel Fiji Limited
AS132528🇦🇺DIGICELAUSPTYLTD-AS-AP - DIGICEL (AUS) PTY LTD
13 total
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About ASPA - what it is and why AS4637 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS4637 (ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

Related Tools and Guides

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