AS4755 ASPA Check - TATA Communications Formerly VSNL Is Leading ISP
TATACOMM-AS - TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP🇮🇳 - ASPA check for AS4755: the upstream transit providers AS4755 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS4755 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.
AS4755 has not published its own ASPA object, but 17 ASNs list it as an authorized upstream provider.
Peering Topology
Downstream Customers(17)
These ASNs list AS4755 as an authorized upstream provider.
| ASN | Name |
|---|---|
| AS7494 | 🇮🇳POWERNET-AS-AP - POWERNET |
| AS9829 | 🇮🇳BSNL-NIB - National Internet Backbone |
| AS9885 | 🇮🇳NKN-INTERNET-GW - NKN INTERNET GATEWAY NETWORK |
| AS55806 | 🇮🇳VIVACOMM-IN - M/s VIVA Communications |
| AS58717 | 🇧🇩SUMMITCOMMUNICATIONS-BD - Summit Communications Ltd |
| AS58965 | ABSPL-AS-IN - ANJANI BROADBAND SOLUTIONS PVT.LTD. |
| AS59188 | INDIANOIL-AS - IndianOil Corporation Limited |
| AS132278 | 🇮🇳Glencore-AS-IN - Glencore Information Services Private Limited |
| AS132884 | 🇧🇩SUMMIT-BD - Summit Communications Limited |
| AS134303 | ZEACLOUD-AS-IN - ZEACLOUD SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED |
About ASPA - what it is and why AS4755 should publish one
ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.
AS4755 (TATACOMM-AS - TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.
Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools
Related Tools and Guides
- How to run an ASPA check - read and verify an ASPA record step by step
- ASPA explained - how provider authorization stops route leaks
- ASPA Check tool - check the ASPA record of any other ASN
- RPKI & ROA Lookup - validate prefixes and check ASPA records for any ASN
- Global ASPA Adoption Statistics - transit-free ASNs, top upstream providers, adoption trends
- AS4755 Overview - prefixes, BGP routes, peers, and RPKI status