AS49619 ASPA Check - AIRMOB SAS

AIRMOB AIRMOB SAS🇫🇷 - ASPA check for AS49619: the upstream transit providers AS49619 has authorized in its RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object, and the networks that list AS49619 as their provider. Routers that validate ASPA use these records to detect route leaks in BGP paths.

AS49619 has not published its own ASPA object, but 1 ASN lists it as an authorized upstream provider.

Listed as Upstream By
1 ASN
Upstream Providers
-
Downstream Customers
1

Peering Topology

AS49619 peering topology: 0 upstream providers and 1 downstream customerNo upstreams. Downstreams: AS207214.AS49619 - AIRMOB AIRMOB SASAS49619AIRMOB AIRMOB SASAS207214nxhop YBUCONSEIL SASUAS207214 - nxhop YBUCONSEIL SASUUPSTREAMSDOWNSTREAMS

Downstream Customers(1)

These ASNs list AS49619 as an authorized upstream provider.

ASNName
AS207214🇫🇷nxhop YBUCONSEIL SASU
About ASPA - what it is and why AS49619 should publish one

ASPA (Autonomous System Provider Authorization) is a cryptographically signed RPKI object specified in the IETF draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile that lets an AS declare which upstream networks are its authorized transit providers. Together with route origin validation (ROV), ASPA enables BGP route leak detection: routers can reject AS-paths in which a network appears as a provider without being authorized. Route leaks are a frequent cause of large routing incidents, and ROV alone cannot detect them because the origin of a leaked route is correct.

AS49619 (AIRMOB AIRMOB SAS) has not published an ASPA object. Hops through it are therefore "unknown" to ASPA validation - not invalid, but not protected either. An ASPA object lists every transit provider of the network (or AS0 if it has none) and is created in the RIR's hosted RPKI where ASPA is supported, or in a delegated RPKI setup. For most networks the record is a short list of their upstream ASNs.

Create an ASPA object: RIPE Portal · ARIN RPKI · APNIC MyAPNIC · ipctl.io RPKI & ROA tools

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